THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
where the parties have been in disparate positions. Perhaps the oldest manifestation of
this tendency was the manner in which the chancellor looked behind an apparent conveyance of real property to declare a mortage and give an equity of redemption.3r
Among the most recent manifestations are rulings to the effect that a person included
within the provisions of a workmen's compensation act cannot validly~contract himself out of the statute, 32 and that a person working under a wages and hours statute
cannot effectively release his statutory claims against his employer.33 Equity especially has exhibited this tendency, particularly in respect to the assignment of mere expectancies. While in some jurisdictions such assignments have been enforced,34 equity
always looks to the transaction itself with extreme suspicion for several reasons: i) the
assignor of an expectancy was generally in desperate circumstances at the time of the
assignment;3S 2) he was generally greatly inferior in business experience; 6 3) the difficulty in assessing the value of the expectancy usually results in a totally inadequate
consideration.37
Since analogous considerations are applicable in the instant case, it would seem that
the least equity could.do is to refuse to enforce the assignment, leaving the parties to
damages at law. This would probably lead to a settlement. However, in view of the
gambling nature of the contract, the unequal position of the author, the general inadequacy of consideration and the constitutional policy involved, the only straightforward answer to the situation would be to declare assignments like that in the principal
case invalid.

Federal Courts-Removal Jurisdiction of Suits "Arising under" Federal StatuteFair Labor Standards Act-[Federal].-Plaintiff brought suit in a state court to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages, and damages, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act,' which provides that such a suit "may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdiction.' 2 Defendant removed to the federal district court on the
ground that the suit arose under a law regulating commerce, to which the requirement
3' 5Tiffany, Real Property § 1379 (3 d ed. i939). Cf. Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure,
4 Univ. Ch. L. Rev. 575 (1937).

3 Wass v. Bracker Construction Co., 185 Minn. 70, 24o N.W. 464 (1931).
3 Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F. (2d) 622, 626 (C.C.A. 7th x941); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. Morley Construction Co., 98 F. (2d) 781, 789 (C.C.A. 2d 1938); Travis v.
Ray, 41 F. Supp. 6, 8 (Ky. x94'); Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 5 Wage and Hour
Rep. 389 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
34 Inre Lind, [1915] 2 Ch.Div. 345. Contra: Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231 N.W.
675 (1930). See McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 25 N.E. 179 (i8go); Donough v. Garland,
269 Ill. 565, io9 N.E. ioi 5 (i915).
35 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §953 (Symons ed. 1941).
36 Ames v. Ames, 46 Ind. App. 597, 91 N.E. 5o9 (1910); 2 Chafee and Simpson, Cases on
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of jurisdictional amount did not apply.3 On motion to remand to the state court, held,
a suit does not "arise under a law of the United States" within the meaning of the removal statute unless the construction or effect of the law is in dispute. Since the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are unmistakably dear, the suit must be remanded. Phillips V.Pueci.4
The court in the instant case based its decision upon the reiteration by the Supreme
Court, in Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian,s of the language of an earlier case: 6 "A
suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not ....
one arising under those laws .... unless it really and substantially involves a dispute
or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the
determination of which the result depends." The same result has been reached in other
Fair Labor Standards Act cases; 7 and similar results were reached in several cases under the Employers Liability Act,' before those suits were made non-removable by
statute. 9 It has been said that if a dispute as to the construction or effect of a federal
law has been decided by the Supreme Court, future cases involving the same dispute
are not removable,xo and at least one circuit court of appeals has recently approved the
doctrine that no case presents a federal question if only issues of fact are involved.Y
The "established trend" of legislation towards limitation of the jurisdiction of the
federal trial courts has been judicially recognized, 2 and the "disputed construction or
3 38 Stat. 219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (8) (1927). 18 Stat. 470 (1875), as amended, 28
U.S.C.A. § 71 (1927) provides: "Any suit .... arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, .... of which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction, ... may be removed into the district court of the United States for the proper district.....
4 43 F. Supp. 253 (Mo. 1942).
5 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936), holding that a suit to colledt state taxes on a national bank pursuant to a state tax statute did not "arise under" the federal statute permitting such taxation,
since the federal statute was not the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action. See text accompanying note 20 infra.

6Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912), rephrasing similar language in Little
York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 2o3 (1877).
7Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (Neb. 1942); Kuligowski v. Hart, 43
F. Supp. 207 (Ohio 194i); Garrity v. Iowa-Nebraska Light &Power Co., unreported (Neb. 1941);

Wingate v. Gen'l Auto Parts Co., 4o F. Supp. 364 (Mo. 3194), noted in SS Harv. L. Rev.
541 (1942), and 26 Minn. L. Rev. 134 (194I); Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861 (Mo.
1941), noted in 6 Mo. L. Rev. 519 (1941). Contra: Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont, 43

F. Supp. 785 (S.C. 1942); see Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (N.J. i94o).
9 Nelson v. Southern R. Co., 172 Fed. 478 (C.C. Ga. igog); Liggett v. Great Northern R.
Co., i8o Fed. 314 (C.C. Minn. ig9o); cf. Myrtle v. Nevada C. & 0. R. Co., 137 Fed. r93 (C.C.
Nev. 19o5) (Safety Appliances Act).
9 36 Stat. 291 (1g1), 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (1928).
20 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Nolan, 240 Fed. 754 (D.C. Mont. i917); Myrtle v. Nevada C. &
0. R. Co., 137 Fed. 193 (C.C. Nev. igo5).
" Marshall v. Desert Properties Co., io3 F. (2d) 551, 552 (C.C.A. gth 1939), cert. den. 308
U.S. 563 (1939); see Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 126 F. (2d) x64 (C.C.A. 5th 1942). For
an earlier expression of the same view, see Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 45 Fed. 812
(C.C. Neb. 1891).
"Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 35 (1934).
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effect" rule has had wide application. But its use in cases where, as in the instant case,
the suit "arises under a law of the United States" in the sense that the right sued upon
was directly created by that law, so that if the law had not been enacted, no such suit
could have been brought, has been severely criticized.13 It may be suggested that an
analysis of the situations in which the rule has commonly been applied indicates that
it should not be applied in this situation.
The "disputed construction or effect" rule originated in suits involving rights in
lands which originally had been held by the Federal Government, and had passed to
private owners in accordance with the public land laws.14 It was argued that because
title had been derived from the Federal Government, the suit arose under a law of the
United States. But while title was derived from the United States, the rights asserted
in these suits arose under local or general property law, and the provisions of the federal
laws were not in dispute. In setting up the "disputed construction" test to show that
such suits did not arise under the laws of the United States, the Court was aware that
otherwise "every suit to establish title to land in the central and western states would
so arise, as all titles in those states are traceable back to those laws."'5 Where the
terms of the title granted by the Federal Government are actually in dispute, federal
6
jurisdiction obtains.
The "disputed construction" rule has been applied in several situations in addition
to the land cases, in which the right actually at issue was not granted by a federal law.
Thus, a suit to prevent a municipality from altering the rights granted by a previous
ordinance does not arise under a law of the United States because it is alleged that the
change will impair the obligation of contracts; fundamentally, the suit is based on the
contract between the municipality and plaintiff-and the breach thereof-not upon
the Constitution.X7 A suit to enforce a contract based upon, or framed in accordance
with, a federal law, does not present a federal question, since it is the contract, not the
law, which is the basis of the suit.'8 And a suit to enforce a state law does not arise
13 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. American Cotton Oil Co., 229 Fed. ii, 21 (C.C.A. th
5
1916); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kansas City,,Mexico & Orient R. Co., 251 Fed. 332 (D.C. Tex.

i918); McGoon v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 204 Fed. 998 (D.C.N.D. i913 ); Toledo, Ann Arbor
& Northern Michigan R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 732 (C.C. Ohio 1893).
14 Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 56I (1912); Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v.
Keyes, 96 U.S. i99 (1877); Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (igo6); Shoshone Mining.Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 5io (igoo); Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313 (io6); McFadden v.
Robinson, 22 Fed. io (C.C. Cal. x884). It should be noted that Marshall v. Desert Properties
Co., 1-3 F. (2d) 55, (C.C.A. 9th 1931), cert. den. 308 U.S. 563 (i939), note ii supra, falls
within this category.
is Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 56i, 569 (1912), note 6 supra, immediately following the
previous quotation.
16 Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (917); Ter Haar v. Kettleman North Dome Ass'n,
34 F. Supp. 823 (Cal. i94o); Hills v. Homton, Fed. Cas. No. 6,5o8 (C.C. Cal. 1877).
'7 Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913); Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance,
191 U.S. 184 (io3); New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U.S. 411 (1894); cf. Tennessee v. Union &
Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
is State Automobile Ins. Ass'n v. Parry, 123 F. (2d) 243, 246 (C.C.A. 8th 194i) (suit on
insurance policy covering liability "as required by the Motor Carriers Act"); Teague v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 127 F. (2d) 53 (C.C.A. 6th 1942) (suit to set aside collective
agreement under Railway Labor Act); Bernhart v. Western Maryland R. Co., 41 F. Supp. 898
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under a law of the United States, because a federal law affects the validity of, or creates a defense to, the state law.' 9 In none of these situations, except that involving the
public lands, is plaintiff's right to sue dependent upon the existence of the federal law.
In many of these cases, in fact, the federal question did not properly appear in the
complaint, being matter of defense or reply; thus there was no original federal jurisdiction, apart from any question of "disputed construction."2o In the land cases, the
federal law is necessary only because of the formal allegation of "title" as lirerequisite
to standing to sue. If it be assumed that in the absence of a federal grant-i.e., if the
land involved had never been public land-plaintiff would have acquired title from the
then appropriate source, the public land cases also fall within this category.2%
Where the suit may be brought regardless of the existence of the federal law, it
might fairly be said that the suit did not "arise" under that law."2 Where, however, the
right which the suit is brought to enforce is given exclusively by a federal law, so that
in the absence of that law there would be nothing upon which to base the suit, it would
seem that the suit does "arise" under that law, in the usual sense of the term. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the "disputed construction" rule should not be applied in such cases. 23 Thus, a suit for infringement of a patent is held to present a federal question regardless of whether the terms of the patent are in dispute;24 similarly, a
suit arising under the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board." As was pointed out
in cases under the Employers Liability Act, to hold that a federal question is presented
only if the construction of the statute is disputed, is in effect to hold that there is fed(Md. 194) (suit on wage agreement negotiated under non-compulsory terms of Transportation Act of 1920); cf. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 271 U.S. 749 (r9o8) (free
transportation agreement made in settlement of injury claim interfered with by anti-pass provisions of Hepburn Act).
29 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian; 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Starin v. New York, iz
5
U.S. 248, 257 (1885) (suit to enforce exclusive ferrying franchise granted by state, claimed to
conflict with federal coasting license); Georgia v. Southern R. Co., 25 F. Supp. 630 (Ga. 1938)
(suit to enjoin discontinuance of portion of line, discontinuance authorized by ICC).
20 The existence of a federal question must be determined by the statements in the complaint which are necessary to the plaintiff's cause of action, unaided by the answer or the petition for removal. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. og, 113 (1936); American
Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (xgi6); In re Winn, 213 U.S. 458 (1909); see
Great Northern R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 281-82 (Igi8). See note 27 infra.
2zThe effect of this assumption is merely to place land descended from the public domain
on the same footing as land descended from private owners. Particularly where the present
owners are remote grantees from the government, there is no reason why this should not be
done.
2 Cases cited note i8 supra. But cf. Young & Jones v. Hiawatha Gin & Mfg. Co., I7 F.
(2d) 193 (D.C. Miss. 1927).
'3 See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933); Swafford v. Templeton, i85
U.S. 487, 493 (I902); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 5Io (19oo).
'4 The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913); see McGoon v. Northern
Pacific R. Co., 204 Fed. 998, 1000, 1004 (D.C. N.D. 1913).
s Federal Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust Co., 9I F. (2d) 283, 285 (C.C.A. 5 th 1937), cert.
den. 302 U.S. 738 (937); cf. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 95 F. (2d) 67r (C.C.A.
5 th 1938), aff'd 306 U.S. 103 (1939) (suit to wind up affairs of national bank).
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eral jurisdiction if the parties do not agree that the suit arises uncler the Act; but not,
if they agree that it does.26 As a practical matter, federal jurisdiction would never obtain, because it is impossible to ascertain from the complaint whether defendant will
dispute the construction of the law, or merely contest the facts alleged. 27 The result
would be to "nullify the language of the removal statute by a process of reasoning
which professes to ascertain its meaning."' 2
It is now dear that the federal courts have original jurisdiction of suits to enforce
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,29 as was admitted by the court in the instant case. There is no apparent reason for differentiating between "arising under a
law of the United States" as used in reference to the original and to the removal jurisdictions.3o In denying removal of suits arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
federal courts have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid encumbering their
dockets with large numbers of small claims,3r and in part by a desire to give the employee the choice of forums. It is argued that the employee should not be put to the
greater expense of suing in the federal court if he does not wish to do so; 32 and that by
using the word "maintained" instead of "commenced," or a similar word, in Section
216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress intended to make suits brought under
it non-removable.33 But the force of the first of these arguments is weakened by the
provision in Section 216 for the recovery of costs and attorney's fees; and "maintained"
* has been used in so many senses that it does not seem a reliable indication of Congressional intention, particularly in view of the clear expressions thereof enacted in regard
to the Employers Liability Act. Rather, the absence of any similar language in the
Fair Labor Standards Act seems to indicate that Congress did not intend to make these
suits non-removable.34
26Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. American Cotton Oil Co., 229 Fed. i, 21 (C.C.A.
th
i9i6); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, Mexico & Orient R. Co., 251 Fed. 332, 334
5
(D.C. Tex.i9x8). For an example of a dispute as to the applicability of the FLSA, see Stucker
v. Roselle, 37 F. Supp. 864 (Ky. 1941).
27Allegations in the complaint as to the nature of the defense are treated as surplusage for
jurisdictional purposes, nor can the complaint be supplemented by the petition for removal;
see Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 1o9, 113 (1936); note 20 supra.
2"McGoon v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 204 Fed. 998, 1oo4 (D.C. N.D. 1913).
"9Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F. (2d) 285 (1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 681 (1941);
Tolliver v. Cudahy, 39 F. Supp. 337 (Tenn. 1941); Lengel v. Newark Newsdealers' Supply
Co., 32 F. Supp. 567 (N.J. 194o); Campbell v. Superior Decalcominia Co., 31 F. Supp. 663
(Tex. 1940).
30 Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (19o6); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. American Cotton Oil Co., 229 Fed. ii, 21 (C.C.A. 5th I916).
31 Frankly admitted in Wingate v. Gen'l Auto Parts Co., 4o F. Supp. 364, 366 (Mo. x941).
32

Ibid., at 365.

33 Ibid.;
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1942);

Kuligowski v.

Hart, 43 F. Supp. 207 (Ohio, x941).
34 Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont, 43 F. Supp. 785 (S.C. 1942); see Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (N.J. 194o). But see Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,

44 F. Supp. 451, 456 (Neb. 1942).

